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OVER-STUFFING THE ENVELOPE: THE
PROBLEMS WITH CREATIVE TRANSFER OF
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
I.

Introduction

The zoning envelope is an imaginary three-dimensional mold which
represents a building's maximum development potential.' Not every
building in New York City, however, is the same height. Some
structures fall well within the boundaries of the zoning envelope,
while others burst through its confines. 2 The concept of transferable
development rights (TDR) permits manipulation of the zoning envelope.3

TDR represents a variety of transactions in which the owner of
a small building or landmark severs, sells and transfers his unused
development rights to another parcel of land. 4 The New York City
1. See E. BASSET, ZONING 23-24 (1940) [hereinafter BASSET]; Allen, The Envelope
Stuffers, MANHATTAN, INC., Aug. 1986, at 23 [hereinafter Allen].
2. See supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See generally Basile, A View from Here; Transferable Development Rights,
ENVTL. COMMENT, Apr. 1978, at 9; Bellandi, Transfer of Development Rights, 5
CoMp. URB. RES. 85 (1978); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: Description
and Perspectives for a Critique, 34 URB. LAND 5 (1975); Costonis, Space Adrift:
A Synopsis, 34 URB. LAND 16 (1975); Scardino, Trading Air to Build Towers,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1986, at Dl, col. 2 [hereinafter Scardino]; Dunlap, City's
Plan to Sell Air Rights at Landmarks Draws Critics, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1984,
at 51, col. 1 [hereinafter Dunlap]. Specifically, the transfer of development rights
(TDR) takes place within a zoning lot. The concept of a zoning lot, however, has
continuously expanded over the years. Traditionally, a zoning lot consisted of a
tract of land, either subdivided or containing two or more lots held in single fee
or lease ownership. See N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 12-10(a)-(c) (1961). Thus, a
transfer of air rights could take place only between adjacent properties held in
common ownership. See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text. An amendment
to the zoning resolution enlarged the definition of a zoning lot to include contiguous
separately-owned parcels, provided that the owners recorded a declaration of single
lot ownership. N.Y. CrrY ZONING RES. § 12-10 (1977); reprinted in Report on the
Modifications to the Definition of Zoning Lot, [1977] N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N
REP. N-760226-ZRY, at 3 [hereinafter REP. N-760226-ZRY]. Consequently, TDR
can take place between two adjacent separately-owned parcels within a single zoning
lot. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text. Landmark buildings are a special
case. A 1968 amendment to the zoning resolution expanded the concept of adjacent
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Zoning, Resolution permits non-landmark buildings to transfer development rights to adjacent, contiguous sites.' Landmarks have the
flexibility to transfer development rights across .a street or intersection. 6 The transfer of development rights within the scope of New
York City's zoning laws has multiple benefits. The transferor site
can economically realize its development potential without actually
renovating or rebuilding. 7 The owner of the receiving parcel can
build a structure that exceeds the zoning resolution's height and
density regulations.' Most importantly, since TDR within the guidelines of the zoning resolution permits the redistribution of development rights rather than the relocation of these rights to other
areas of the city, 9 developers benefit from the transaction without
sacrificing the urban planning objectives behind zoning laws. l0 The
urban planning objectives which have formed the basis of New York
12
City's zoning laws since 191611 include population density control,
preservation of light and air on city blocks' 3 and preservation of
4
the architectural character of neighborhoods.
Private developers and not-for-profit institutions" are presently
engaging in innovative transactions that are pushing TDR to new
lot to include lots across the street or intersection from a landmark. N.Y. CITY
ZONING RES. § 74-79 (1968), reprinted in Report on Transfer of Development Rights
from Landmark Sites, [1968] N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. CP-20253, at 301
[hereinafter REP. CP-20253]. Thus, a landmark can transfer unused development
rights to a non-contiguous receiving lot with more flexibility than an ordinary
building. See infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
5. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 12-10 (1986); see infra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
6. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 74-79 (1986); see infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
7. Allen, supra note 1, at 23; Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1; Scardino,
supra note 4, at D3, col. 1.
8. See supra note 7.
9. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 1-3; see infra notes 118-21, 201 and
accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
11. The 1916 zoning ordinance was intended to protect public health and safety
and to assure adequate light and air. See Evans, New York City Zoning: A
Comparison of 1916 and 1961 Ordinances 7 (1980) (unpublished thesis) (available
at Avery Library of Columbia University) [hereinafter Evans]; see also ZONING
HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY ZONING RESOLUTION 7 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 HANDBOOK].
12. G. FORD, BUILDING ZONES: A HANDBOOK OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE HEIGHT,
AREA AND USE OF BUILDINGS, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO NEW YORK CITY 1
(1917) [hereinafter FORD].
13. Id.
14. See Allen, supra note 1, at 24; Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1; Scardino,
supra note 4, at Dl, col. 1; infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
15. Not-for-profit institutions include private and municipal performing arts

19881

DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

extremes. 16 Economic and development pressures 17 have forced these
cultural"8 and religious 9 institutions, as well as the City of New
York, 20 to consider financing their particular services through the
transfer of unused development rights. 2 Projects involving Grand
Central Terminal, 22 South Street Seaport 23 and Old Slip 24 exemplify
exceptions that the Board of Estimate has created to its own zoning
laws for the benefit of not-for-profit organizations. 25 In 1969, for
example, the Board of Estimate amended the zoning resolution to
permit Grand Central Terminal to transfer its unused development
centers, museums and a variety of religious and non-religious landmark buildings.
See Blum, Museums Turning to Air Rights for Revenues, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7,

1983, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter Blum]; see also Freilberg, City Center's Blockbusting

Performance, METROPOLIS, at 11 (June 1985); Landmarking Enhances Ministries,
METROPOLIS, at 10 (June 1985); Gargan, Planning Agency Backs Firehouse AirRights Sale, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1981, at B3, col. 2 [hereinafter Gargan].
16. See Allen, supra note 1, at 23-24; Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1;
Scardino, supra note 4, at DI, col. 1. Typically, in TDR transactions between notfor-profit institutions and developers, a private developer offers an institution a
large amount of money and perhaps an annual operating subsidy, or even additional
facilities in a newly constructed building in return for the transfer of the organization's unused development rights, which exist because the organization's building
contains less bulk than is allowable under current zoning. See, e.g., Report on
Permit Application to Transfer Development Rights to 30 Old Slip, [1984] N.Y.
CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. C-841070-ZSM, at 13-14 [hereinafter REP. C-841070ZSM]; see infra notes 180-203 and accompanying text. The developer can transfer
this additional developable floor area to a building being constructed on an adjacent
or nearby site. The result is a larger, more valuable building which is now permitted
to exceed the maximum bulk for its particular site by the amount of air rights
transferred from the not-for-profit organization's building. See supra note 8.
17. See Blum, supra note 15, at 1, col. 2; Winkleman, Non-profits: At What
Price Survival? METROPOLIS, at 18 (Dec. 1981) [hereinafter Winkleman].

18. The Museum of Modern Art in New York City considered air rights transfer
because it would provide the museum with the resources to build its new wing.

Blum, supra note 15, at 1, cols. 1-2.
19. Religious landmarks have sold their air rights for various economic reasons.
St. Bartholomew's church on Park Avenue, in New York City, recognized that
the sale of air rights "amounts to a permanent endowment" enabling the church
to increase its services to the poor. Goldberger, Who Owns Landmarks?, PRaisERVATION NEWS, Mar. 1984, at 1, col. 2. The officials of St. Paul's and St.
Andrew's churches hope that proceeds from a development rights sale will keep
these structures standing. See Winkleman, supra note 17, at 19.

20. New York City's sale of unused development rights over a midtown firehouse
on the West Side represented a way of generating additional revenues for the city.
See Gargan, supra note 15, at 3, col. 2.
21. See generally Blum, supra note 15, at 1, col. 2; Winkleman, supra note
17, at 18.

22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 180-204 and accompanying text.
Allen, supra note 1, at 23.
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rights to previously impermissible distances. 26 In order to revitalize
the South Street Seaport area, the City Planning Commission created
a special district of transferor lots and receiving lots and permitted
the transfer of air rights between the two directly or through an
intervening "air rights bank."" 27 Most recently, the City Planning
Commission approved a plan to merge a landmark, a firehouse and
a portion of Old Slip Street to form a "landmark zoning lot" in
order to increase the amount of available development rights for
transfer.

2

Perhaps the most important benefit of creative TDR transactions 29 is the survival of cultural institutions through the generation
of revenues. 30 The price of survival, however, may be increased bulk
on city blocks, loss of light and air on the streets, congestion in
the subways and a strain on neighborhood services.3
This Note will explore whether these innovative TDR transactions
involving not-for-profit organizations have stretched the zoning laws
and set precedents that thwart traditional urban planning objectives.3 2
First, the Note will examine the evolution of TDR in New York
City from the inception of the concept in the 1916 Zoning Ordinance
to the current definition in the New York City Zoning Resolution.
Second, this Note will discuss the radical applications of TDR in
connection with Grand Central Terminal, South Street Seaport and
Old Slip. Finally, the Note will evaluate creative applications of
TDR in light of urban planning goals and propose a literal interpretation of the existing zoning resolution to protect these goals.
II.

The Evolution of TDR

The evolution of the concept of TDR corresponds with the patterns
of urban growth and the increasing sophistication of real estate

26. See infra notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 161-79 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 180-204 and accompanying text.
29. The City Planning Commission articulated some of these benefits: "[t]he
owner of a designated landmark building can realize an economic gain by selling
his unbuilt, but allowable development rights; the- buyer of these rights, in return,
can acquire additional floor area he would otherwise not have; the neighborhood,
meanwhile can retain an essential amenity, a revitalized landmark." REP. CP-20253,
supra note 4, at 303.
30. Mayor Koch maintains that the survival of our cultural institutions is
"'extremely

important to the future of this city .... Culture is one of the main

reasons so many tourists come here and one of the reasons so many companies
stay,' " Blum, supra note 15, at 1, col. 2 (quoting Mayor Edward Koch).
31. FORD, supra note 12, at 1; see infra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
32. Allen, supra note 1, at 23-24; Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1.
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development deals that New York City has experienced since the
inception of city zoning regulations. The historical evolution of the
concept of TDR spans a sixty year period from 1916 to 1977.1 3 The
1916 Zoning Ordinance allowed adjacent lots to combine their air
rights to erect a tower exceeding height regulations.3 4 This merger
of rights provides an early example of TDR. In 1961, the City
Planning Commission reorganized the zoning law and introduced
the concept that every building lot had a maximum development
potential. 5 This concept supported the idea that a building underutilizing its development potential could sell and transfer the excess
air rights.3 6 The 1961 Zoning Resolution also permitted TDR between
a parcel held by a long-term lease contiguous to a parcel commonly
owned in fee. 37 The City Planning Commission helped relieve landmarked buildings of some of the constraints of landmark status
designation in the 1968 amendment to the zoning resolution.3 The
amendment permitted landmarks to transfer their unused air rights
across a street or intersection.3 9 In the 1977 Zoning Resolution, the
City Planning Commission amended the definition of zoning lot
ownership to provide for TDR between two contiguous, separately
owned parcels as long as a recorded declaration of merger was
filed.40
A.

The 1916 Zoning Ordinance

Prior to 1916, New York City had no laws limiting the height
of buildings. 41 The city, however, recognized the need for zoning
to control population density, building size and land use. 42 In 1916,
the Board of Estimate enacted the city's first building zone reso-

See infra notes 41-122 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
See id.
See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
See id.
See infra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
Some cities did have some form of building height regulation by 1916. See
BASSET, supra note 1, at 22-24 (Boston, Los Angeles). In New York City, however,
"[a] building could legally rise to any height whatever, assume any form, be put
to any use, and cover 100 percent of the lot from the ground to the sky." Many
builders erected structures that covered the entire lot space and had the same floor
area on the top floors as at the base. It is easy to see how overdevelopment of
this sort "made dark canyons of" Wall Street's narrow passages. Id.
42. Id. at 23; 1980 HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 7.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

48
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lution, 43 based on studies made by appointed commissions." The
first commission, the Commission on the Height, Size and Arrangement of Buildings, studied methods of land use controls and building
height regulation.4 5 The final report of the second zoning commission,
the Commission on Building Districts and Restrictions, appointed
to formulate building restrictions and organize the districts, 46 became
the 1916 Zoning Ordinance. 47 The 1916 Resolution sought to maintain
property values 4s and preserve light and air on city streets 49 through
52
height,50 area 5 and public use regulations.

43. See FORD, supra note 12, at 1; see also Evans, supra note 11, at 10.
Originally, New York City relied on the concept of eminent domain to legitimize
its zoning proposal. BASSET, supra note 1, at 26. Ultimately, the zoning resolution
was enacted and its constitutionality upheld under a declaration of the state's police
power. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209
(1920) (new zoning ordinance adopted by Board of Estimate held lawful exercise of police power that did not encumber real property); see also Village of
Euclid v. Amber Realty, Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1920) (zoning ordinances are
valid exercise of police power for municipalities, provided regulations are reasonable
and not arbitrary); E. BASSET, ATTITUDES OF COURTS TOwARDs ZONING 3 (1923).
The rationale behind this choice was two-fold. First, the purpose of the ordinance
was to protect the health, safety and general welfare of New York citizens. Second,
an effective zoning plan would never be implemented by an exercise of eminent
domain. Under the theory of eminent domain, a municipality must compensate an
owner for confiscated property. The city anticipated that this would result in a
laborious and expensive proceeding for almost every land parcel. Under the police
power, a municipality need not compensate an owner for property taken or limitations imposed on its use. Id.; FORD, supra note 12, at 28; see also F. WILL4MS,
THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING

11-19 (1922).

44. See Evans, supra note 11, at 7, 10.
45. See BASSET, supra note 1, at 20; FORD, supra note 12, at 1; Evans, supra
note 11, at 7, 10.

46. Evans, supra note 11, at 10.
47. See BASSET, supra note 1, at 20-21; Evans, supra note, 11, at 7, 10.
48. FORD, supra note 12, at 1.
49. See BASSET, supra note 1, at 20, 23; FORD, supra note 12, at 1; Evans,
supra note 11, at 19; see also COMMISSION ON BUILDING DISTRICTS, FINAL REPORT
35-36 (1916) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
50. Height regulations were based on adjacent street width calculations. See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 321; see also N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 8 (1916),
reprinted in FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 236. See generally G. FORD, BUILDING,
HEIGHT, BULK AND

FoRM 63-65 (1916).

51. The zoning resolution provided for five classes of area districts, distinctive
in their varying regulations as to depths of yards and other open spaces. See FORD,
supra note 12, at 4, 5; FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 38; see also N.Y. CITY
ZONING RES. § 10 (1916), reprinted in FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 238.
52. The Commission provided for four classes of use districts: residential,
business, unrestricted and undetermined. See FORD, supra note 12, at 14; FINAL
REPORT, supra note 49, at 15; see also N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 2 (1916), reprinted
in FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 233.
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This provision imposed limitations on a building's height based
on varying multiples of adjacent street width." The law, however, permitted towers to exceed all height and setback limitations
provided that they did not occupy more than twenty-five percent

of the area of the lot at their base.14 An air rights transfer under
the 1916 Zoning Ordinance was an agreement by a developer to
combine the unused air rights from a contiguous lot" to create6 a
sufficiently large lot which could comfortably support a tower.
B.

TDR Meets FAR: The 1961 Zoning Resolution

In the late 1950's, it became clear that the 1916 Zoning Ordinance
was obsolete. 7 Overbuilding continued in New York City's already
congested areas while other sections remained underdeveloped.5" As
a result, in 1961, the Vorhees Zoning Study, a major research project
commissioned to investigate the shortcomings of the 1916 Ordinance,
proposed a new resolution.5 9 The 1961 Zoning Resolution introduced

53. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 32; see also N.Y. CITY ZONING RES.
§ 8 (1916), reprinted in FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 236.
One scholar elaborated on these limitations:
The ordinance contained five classes of height districts which limited the
height of a building at the street line to a varying multiple of the street
width upon which the building fronted. The five districts were 1 times,
1 1/4 times, 1 1/2 times, 2 times, and 2 1/2 times street width. Streets
which were less than 50 feet wide were considered 50 feet wide and
streets which were more than 100 feet wide were considered 100 feet
wide. At intersections, the height of the wider street governed building
development for 100 feet back onto the narrower street, or in the case
of a single corner building, 150 feet back.
Evans, supra note 11, at 12.
54. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 9(d) (1916), reprinted in FINAL REPORT, supra
note 49, at 237.
55. Under New York Department of Buildings guidelines, a "lot" was deemed
to be any number of contiguous parcels held in common ownership or separate
ownership if one of the parcels profited from the adjoining parcel's air rights
through sale, lease or other conveyance. Marcus, Air Rights in New York City:
TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv.
867, 871-72 [hereinafter Marcus]; see also N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 9(d) (1916)
(accompanying drawings), reprinted in FORD, supra note 12, at 6.
56. Marcus, supra note 55, at 873; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 26264; see also N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 9(d) commentary at 6 (1916), reprinted in
FORD, supra note 12, at 6.
57. VOORHEES, WALKER, SMITH & SMITH, ZoNING NEW YORK CITY: A PROPOSAL
ZONING RESOLUTION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK vi (1958) [hereinafter
VOORHEES & WALKER].
FOR A

58. Id.

59. Id.; see also Evans, supra note 11, at 41.
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two important concepts: (1) floor area ratio (FAR); 6° and (2) long61
term lease zoning lot ownership.

Development rights have been expressed in terms of FAR 62 since
1961 . 63 FAR is the principal control on the physical volume of a
building. 64 The underlying concept behind FAR is that each building
lot in the city has a maximum amount of volume and usable floor
area which can be built upon. 65 The City Planning Commission
designates each zoning lot an FAR number ranging from .5 to 15.66
The buildable floor area of any building is the product of the lot's
gross square footage multiplied by its FAR number. 67 For example,
on a 100' by 100' lot with FAR 10, a developer could construct a
building with a maximum of 100,000 gross square feet. This concept-that every building lot has a maximum development potentialpredated the TDR concept that a site which did not utilize all of its
air rights could transfer that excess to another parcel.
In 1961, the Board of Estimate expanded the definition of zoning

lot 68 ownerships to permit the holder of a long-term lease on the

60. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.

62. Floor area ratio controls the physical volume of a building and represents
the relationship between the floor area of a building and the area of the lot on
which it stands. ZONING HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY ZONING
RESOLUTION 16 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 HANDBOOK]. " 'Floor area' is the sum of
the gross areas of the several floors of a building .

.

. measured from the exterior

faces of exterior walls or from center lines of walls separating two buildings" and
" '[f]loor area ratio' (FAR) is the total floor area on a zoning lot, divided by
the lot area of that zoning lot." N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 12-10 (1961); see also
Newport Assoc., Inc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 265, 283 N.E.2d 600, 601, 332
N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973). For example, a building
containing 20,000 square feet of floor area on a zoning lot of 10,000 square feet
has an FAR of 2.0.
63. Evans, supra note 11, at 45.
64. 1961 HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 16.
65. VOORHEES &

WALKER,

supra note 57, at 49.

66. The lowest FAR in any district is .5 FAR. A building with .5 FAR can
contain floor space only equal to one-half the area of the lot on which it stands.
See 1961 HANDBOOK, supra note 62, at 9.
The highest FAR for high density office districts is 15. This FAR, however, may
increase if the developer takes advantage of bonuses. See id.; infra notes 193-94
and accompanying text.
67. See 1980 HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 9.
68. The definition of zoning lot currently provides that two or more adjacent
parcels can form a single zoning lot if they are commonly owned. REP. N-760226ZRY, supra note 4, at 1. A zoning lot under the 1961 zoning resolution was defined
as either:
[1] A tract of land, either unsubdivided or consisting of two or more
contiguous lots of record, located within a single block, which, on the
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zoning lot to exercise control over the parcels in the lot. 69 Many
developers took advantage of this new definition by obtaining leases
on many parcels contiguous to the one that they held in fee ownership. 70 In this way, they were able to build maximum bulk structures
on the land they held in fee, while using the available FAR parcels
they controlled by a long-term lease. 7' The two main advantages for
the developer were: (1) he could obtain large amounts of extra floor
area without the large capital outlay required to purchase the adjacent
sites; and (2) he could deduct air rights lease payments from his
taxes as ordinary business expenses. 72 Costly legal problems,7 3 however, accompanied the termination 74 of these development rights
leases. 75 Courts had to determine the rights of the original lessee
and the fee owner of the formerly leased property. 6 The City

effective date of this resolution or any applicable subsequent amendment
thereto, was in single ownership, or [2] A tract of land, located within
a single block which at the time of filing for a.building permit ... is

designated by its owner or developer as a tract all of which is to be
used, developed, or built upon as a unit under single ownership.
N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 12-10 (1961) (emphasis omitted).
69. Compare Proposed Comprehensive Amendment to the N.Y. City Zoning
Res. § 12-10 (Aug. 18, 1960) (in which new addition to definition appears) with
Proposed Comprehensive Amendment to the N.Y. City Zoning Res. § 12-10 (Mar.
2, 1960) (to which new definition has not yet been added). The 1961 amendment
to the zoning resolution incorporated into the definition of "zoning lot" the provision
that "ownership of a zoning lot shall be deemed to include a lease of not less
than 50 years duration, with an option to renew such lease so as to provide a
total lease of not less than 75 years duration." N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 12-10
(1961) (emphasis omitted).
70. See, e.g., REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 2. In Newport, the defendant
owned two contiguous parcels in fee and leased plaintiff's contiguous parcel for
a term greater. than 70 years. The defendant, in constructing a 45-story office
building on its fee property, was able to incorporate more floor area by transferring
development rights from the leased parcel. See Newport, 30 N.Y.2d at 265, 283
N.E.2d at 601, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 618-19.
71. See, e.g., Newport, 30 N.Y.2d at 265, 283 N.E.2d at 601, 332 N.Y.S.2d at
619. The amendment permitted the defendant to use the excess air space on the
leased property in assessing maximum floor space for the building constructed on
the fee property because the fee property was contiguous to the lease-held property.

See id.
72. R. PELLICIOTTI, THE EVOLUTION AND INNOVATIVE UTILIZATION OF TRANsFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN MANHATTAN 6 (1986).
73. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 1-2.
74. These leases, private agreements between the concerned parties, could be
terminated by a breach or bankruptcy of the lessee at any time. Id.
75. Id. at 1. A party could terminate "if the lessee failed to pay the required
rent or if the holder of a mortgage on the leased parcel that was superior to the
development rights lease foreclosed on the lessor." Marcus, supra note 55, at 874.
76. The issue was whether the owner of the improved parcel, after termination

52
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Planning Commission had to take away the ability of the lessee to
transfer development rights from the leased parcel without notice
to the fee owner of that parcel." In order to resolve these issues,
the New York City Board of Estimate amended the zoning reso-

lution's definition of a zoning lot in 1977.78
C.

Landmark Relief: The 1968 Amendment

In 1968, the New York City Planning Commission amended its TDR
regulations, 7 to provide economic relief "' for registered landmark8 1
of the lease on the contiguous lot, was "entitled to maintain and occupy all of
his built space, notwithstanding that a portion of his original zoning lot had been
lost, his remaining lot was now overbuilt, and his building now non-complying."
Marcus, supra note 55, at 874.
It was both legally and literally unclear whether the fee owner of the formally
leased property (i.e., mortgagee or lienor) had any development potential left to
his parcel. Legally, the issue was whether the fee owner could now build upon
the formerly leased parcel despite the transfer of unused development rights to the
contiguous lot. See id. As a practical matter, the fee owner of the formerly leased
property was often unaware of the transfer of his unused development rights.
Under leasehold agreements "unused development rights [could] be shifted ...
from one parcel to another without notice to any interested party" despite the fact
that the rights of these fee owners were superior. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note
4, at 2. This inequity, in particular, prompted the 1977 amendment to the zoning
resolution's definition of zoning lot. Id.
The Newport decision seemed to resolve the legal issue. The court held that the
owner of leased property did pass to the lessee the right to utilize unused air rights
connected with the parcel. 30 N.Y.2d at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d
at 620-21. The issue was finally resolved when the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the First Department of the Appellate Division that "once
• . . one of the contending parties utilized the air rights over the leased property
the other contending party was shorn of all such rights. In short, the laurel wreath
went to the one first to exercise the right." 873 Third Avenue Corp. v. Kenvic
Assocs., 109 A.D.2d 489, 492, 492 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (1st Dep't 1985), aff'd, 67
N.Y.2d 767, 491 N.E.2d 679, 500 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1986).
77. New York City recognized the importance of binding all parties in interest
to the TDR arrangement to prevent the possibility of overbuilding. REP. N-760226ZRY, supra note 4, at 2.
78. Id. at 1.
79. See REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 301.
80. The City Planning Commission articulated two purposes for amending the
TDR regulations: to help maintain landmark buildings and to provide economic
relief to the landmark owners by permitting the transfer of development rights
from a landmark site to a contiguous lot or a lot across the street or intersection.
See id. at 302-03.
81. The term "landmark" encompasses "[a]ny improvement, any part of which
is thirty years or older, which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic
interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of
the city, state or nation, and which has been designated as a landmark." NEW
YoRK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, § 25-302(n) (1986); see Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110 n.9 (1978); Goldin, Policy on Landmarks
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buildings.8 2 The constraints8 3 of landmark status designation,8 ' imposed by the 1965 Landmarks Preservation Law,8" created severe finan-

cial hardships for city landmarks. 86 The controversy 7 over whether
the Penn Central Transportation Co. could redevelop the Grand Central Terminal, played a major role in liberalizing the zoning resolution to compensate88 for these prohibitions.

Must Be Reassessed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, § 8, at 10, col. 1 [hereinafter
Goldin).
82. REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 301. The new landmark amendment to
the zoning resolution permitted landmarks to transfer development rights to an
adjacent lot, provided that the adjacent lot utilized these rights to build a structure
in architectural harmony with the landmark building. See N.Y. CITY ZONING RES.
§§ 74-79 (1968), reprinted in REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 301. More importantly,
the amendment expanded the term "adjacent lot" to mean a lot "contiguous to
the lot occupied by the landmark building or one which is across a street and
opposite to the lot occupied by the landmark building, or, in the case of a corner
lot, one which fronts on the same street intersection as the lot occupied by the
landmark building." Id. (emphasis omitted).
83. The restrictions landmark designation imposes on a landmark owner include
a duty to maintain exterior fixtures of the building in good repair and to secure
approval from the City Planning Commission to alter these features. Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 111-12; see also NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 3, §§ 25-306
to 25-311 (1986); Goldin, supra note 81, at 1, col. 1. The purpose of these limitations
is to balance "the public interest in the maintenance of the structure and the
landowner's interest in use of the property." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 112.
84. The Landmarks Preservation Commission has primary responsibility for
administering the Landmarks Preservation Law. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
110. The responsibility of the Commission in designating landmark status is to
identify properties and areas that have special historical or aesthetic value in
satisfaction of the Landmarks Preservation Law's criteria. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ch. 3, §§ 25-302(n), 25-303 (1986), construed in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
110.
85. The enactment of the Landmarks. Preservation Law stemmed from the
realization that New York City's endurance as both a tourist center and financial
capital rested on the preservation of its landmarks through "comprehensive measures
to safeguard desirable features" of the buildings and surrounding areas. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 109; see also NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. .3, § 25301 (1986).
86. See Winkleman, supra note 17, at 18.
87. In the Penn Central decision, Penn Central Transportation Co. challenged

the constitutionality of the Landmarks Preservation Law and its prohibition on a
landmark's reconstruction and development. The Landmark Preservation Commission had designated Grand Central Terminal a landmark in 1967. 438 U.S. at 115.
Penn Central hoped to increase its income through the construction of a multistory
office tower above the terminal. Id. at 116-17. The Supreme Court held that an
application of the Landmarks Preservation Law did not constitute the taking of
property without just compensation or due process of law in violation of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 119.
88. The purpose of liberalizing the conditions under which landmarks could
transfer their development rights was "to ensure that the Landmarks Law would
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The amendment expanded the concept of "adjacent lot" beyond
contiguous parcels8 9 to include lots across the street or intersections
from the landmark. ° The rationale of this provision was to increase
the air rights transfer options 9l of landmarks generally located in
92
areas of dense development.
The City Planning Commission incorporated several limitations
into the amendment to compensate for the broadened. definition of
"adjacent lot." 93 The receiving lot could not receive more than a
twenty percent floor area increase 94 as a result of the transfer. 95 In
addition, the landmark owner could not sell the same portion of
his unused floor area more than once. 96 The City Planning Com-

not unduly restrict the development options of the owners of Grand Central
Terminal" as well as other landmark owners. Id. at 114; REP. CP-20253, supra
note 4, at 303.
89. For a pre-1961 definition of "zoning lot," see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
90. The 1968 amendment to the zoning resolution expanded the term "adjacent
lot" to mean (1) a lot contiguous to the landmark building; (2) a lot across a
street and opposite to the landmark building; or (3) in the case of a corner lot,
a lot that "fronts on the same street intersection as the lot occupied by the landmark
building." N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 74-79 (1968), reprinted in REP. CP-20253,
supra note 4, at 301 (emphasis omitted);
91. See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also REP. CP-20253, supra
note 4, at 303.
92. REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 302-03. The City Planning Commission
understood the delicate balance of factors:
[A] number of the [clity's designated landmarks are located on lots where
the zoning resolution would permit much larger buildings to be constructed. Such zoning quite properly reflects the fact that these particular
lots are located in part of New York where intensive development is not
only generally appropriate but also economically desirable. The City
Planning Commission [also] realistically faced the fact that quite a few
of the landmarks most valuable to preserve for aesthetic and historic
reasons are also located on lots whose economic potential greatly exceeds
their present use.
Id.; see also Allen, supra note 1, at 23.
93. REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 302-03.
94. Id. The City Planning Commission limited the amount of air rights transferable to any one zoning lot contiguous to the landmark to encourage architecture
that would "relate to and enrich the area surrounding the [c]ity's landmarks," and
"to insure that no single zoning lot [would] become burdened with an excessive
concentration of bulk." Id.
95. Id. at 302. The resolution provided that a receiving lot could not obtain
air rights from a landmark that would cause it to "exceed the basic maximum
allowable floor area by more than 20 per cent." N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 74792 (1968), reprinted in REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 302 (emphasis omitted).
96. REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 303. Although a landmark owner could
not sell the same portion of these excess air rights more than once, he could sell
separate portions "of his unused floor area to several adjacent owners." Id.
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mission reserved the right to approve any development-rights
transactions 97 under the amendments in order to protect the surrounding area from overdevelopment.98
The air rights transfer variation permitted by the amendment
affords a number of parties multiple benefits. 99 For example, the
landmark owner is able to realize the potential development value
of his landmark. 1°° The air rights purchaser receives additional floor

area he would not otherwise have.' 0' The city receives tax revenues
from what was originally untaxable'0 2 and most importantly, the
public is able to continue to enjoy historic buildings and sites. 10
The flexibility that the 1968 amendment provides in transferring

air rights, however, may result in a sacrifice of traditional urban

planning objectives. 0 4 The amendment allows an increase in the bulk
of a new development beyond that permitted by the original zoning
laws. 105 Overdevelopment can result in an increase in population

density and use of neighborhood resources. 0 Thus, "[tihe financial
short-term advantage may very well prove a ...
07
vantage." 1

long-term disad-

97. Id. In order for the City Planning Commission to approve a landmark's
transfer of air rights it had to make one of two findings:
(a) [Tihat the permitted transfer of floor area or minor variations in
the front, height and setback regulations [would] not unduly increase
the bulk of any new development, density of population or intensity of
use in any block, to the detriment of the occupants of buildings on the
block or nearby blocks, and (b) that the program for continuing maintenance [would] result in the preservation of the landmark.
N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 74-792 (1968), reprinted in REP. CP-20253, supra note
4, at 302 (emphasis omitted). The City Planning Commission also had to assess
the "relationship between the landmark building and any new buildings" regarding
material design, scale and height in order to protect the architectural character of
the surrounding area. Id.; see also Report on the Transfer of Development Rights
from Landmark Sites, [1969] N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. CP-20938, at 875,
877 (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter REP. CP-209381.
98. REP. CP-20253, supra note 4, at 303.
99. Id.

100. Id.; see also REP. CP-20938, supra note 97, at 877.
101.
102.
103.
104.

REP. CP-20253, supra note,4, at 303.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 9, 11 and accompanying text.

105. Report on the Transfer of Development Rights from Landmarks, [1970]
N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. CP-21166, at 350, 353 (dissenting report of
Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt) [hereinafter REP. CP-211661.

106. See id. (dissenting report of Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt).
107. See id. (dissenting report of Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt).
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D. TDR and the As-Of-Right Zoning Lot Merger: The 1977
Amendment
The 1977 amendment'0 to the zoning lot definition eliminated the
requirement that a zoning lot be held in single ownership. I°9 The
effect of this amendment was the removal of the concept of combining contiguous lots through long-term lease ownership" ° for the
purpose of floor area ratio expansion."' The new ownership arrangement permitted the creation of a single zoning lot by merging
from adjacent, separately owned parcels 1 2 as long as all parties in
interest" 3 filed ' 4 and recorded"1 5 a declaration of merged single lot
status."16

108. The 1977 amended definition of zoning lot provides:
[A zoning lot is a] tract of land, either unsubdivided or consisting of
two or more lots of record contiguous for a minimum of ten linear feet,
located within a single block, which at the time of filing for a building
permit (or, if no building permit is required, at the time of filing for
a certificate of occupancy) is under single fee ownership and with respect
to which each party having any interest therein is a party in interest.
N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 12-10(c) (1977), reprinted in REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra
note 4, at 4 (emphasis omitted).

109. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 2.
110. Id.

111. Newport Assoc., Inc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 264, 283 N.E.2d 600, 600,
332 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
112. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 2.
113. A party in interest as defined by the amendment includes (1) the fee owner;
(2) the holder of an enforceable recorded interest superior to the fee owner; (3)
the holder of an enforceable recorded interest in the tract of land adversely affected
by the development; (4) the holder of an unrecorded interest in land superior to

or adversely affected by the development. Id. at 4; see N.Y Crrv ZONING RES.
§ 12-10(c)(ii) (1977), reprinted in REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 4. For a
discussion of parties in interest, see MacMillan, Inc. v. CF Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d
386, 391, 437 N.E.2d 1134, 1136, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1982) (space tenant not
a party in interest whose consent is required for zoning lot merger).
114. The declaration must be filed in the office of the City Registrar or County
Clerk. See REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 2; see also N.Y. CITY ZONING
RES. § 12-10(d) (1977), reprinted in REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 4.
115. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 2.
The declaration would declare the several parcels to be one zoning lot,
and this zoning lot would remain integrated, notwithstanding any party's
breach of a provision of the declaration or any agreement ancillary
thereto, until such time as the zoning lot is subdivided in accordance

with existing zoning lot subdivision rules. These rules preclude any subdivision's creating non-compliance with any applicable provisions of the
zoning. The recorded declaration will put all persons on notice that the
several parcels in question have been constituted as one zoning lot. . ..
CITY ZONING RES. § 12-10(d) (1977), reprinted in REP. N-760226ZRY, supra note 4, at 4.
116. REP. N-760226-ZRY, supra note 4, at 2-3.

Id. at 3; see N.Y.
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The amendment represents the city's "interest in avoiding overbuilding."' 1 7 Under the new zoning lot definition, parcels within the
newly merged zoning lot can transfer underutilized FAR to receiving
parcels within that same zoning lot regardless of lot ownership." 8
As such, only the distribution of FAR changes, not the total amount
of development potential."19 Consequently, a parcel that receives air
rights from another parcel within the zoning lot in order to exceed
the allowable FAR compensates for the below maximum FAR densities on the other zoning lot parcels. ,20 The planning rationale behind
this system is that because the zoning lot merger redistributes rather
than relocates total bulk on any given block, the same number of
people interact within the block. 121 This concern for population
control protects neighborhood resources and services from exhaustion. 122
III. Radical Applications of TDR
Despite the limitations on the scope of TDR provided by the 1968
and 1977 amendments,' 23 the City Planning Commission has permitted creative interpretations of the zoning resolution for the benefit
of not-f6r-profit institutions. A 1969 amendment to the zoning resolution in response to the Grand Central Terminal dilemma, for
example, increased the transfer distance of excess landmark development rights. 24 The City Planning Commission also expanded the
way in which TDR may be utilized by creating an area-wide TDR
trangfer district to implement the South Street Seaport renewal program. 25 Most recently, the City Planning Commission authorized
an unorthodox diagonal transfer of development rights from a city
26
owned non-landmark building.'
A.

The Grand Central Drama: Air Rights Leaping
The 1968 liberalization of TDR regulations 127 proved to be
of little use in the case of Grand Central Terminal. 28 A monument to French Beaux-Arts architecture and transportation tech117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
See id.at 1-3.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 161-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 180-204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
Goldin, supra note 81, at 1, col. 1. Air rights transfer has done "little to
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nology,' 29 the terminal was suffering from the decline of the railroads

in the early 1960's.130 The terminal's owner, the Penn Central Transportation Co.,' 3 ' was experiencing economic difficulties' 32 and was looking for a way to convert the building's unused development rights' 33

into an income producing asset.' 34
Grand Central, built long before the development of the concept
of FAR,' exhausted only 1.5 of the available 18 FAR on the site
in 1967. 36 In January of 1968, Penn Central negotiated an air rights

lease with UGP Properties, Inc. of Great Britain for the two million
square feet of available FAR space. 137 The agreement provided for
the construction of a multistory skyscraper 3 above the terminal's

main waiting room. 39 Since the terminal had received landmark
status the previous year, 14 Penn Central had to apply to the City

aid the landmark building, and it allows an overloading of development on another
site." Id. at 1, col. 2.
129. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115.
130. GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL: CITY WITHIN THE CITY 136-39 (D. Nevins ed.
1982).
131. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115.
132. Id. at 120; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324,
333, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 919 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104
(1977).
133. Grand Central Terminal had 16.5 FAR available to transfer in 1967. See
Richards, Transferable Development Rights: Corrective, Catastrophe, or Curiosity?,
31 REAL EST. 'L.J. 26, 32 (1983) [hereinafter Richards].
134. See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-18. In 1968, Penn Central

Transportation Co. contracted with UGP Properties to "construct a multistory
office building above the terminal" in order to increase its income. Id. at 116.
135. Grand Central Terminal opened in 1913, three years before New York City
enacted its first zoning laws and almost 50 years before the utilization of the FAR
concept. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
136. Richards, supra note 133, at 32.
137. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116. The terms of the contract for the office
building construction provided that UGP would pay Penn Central Transportation
Co. $1 million annually thereafter. "The rentals would be offset in part by a loss
of some $700,000 to $1 million in net rentals presently received from concessionaires
displaced by the new building." Id.
138. Marcel Breuer designed two separate plans for the office building that
satisfied the provisions of the zoning resolution. Id. at 116. The "Breuer I" design
called for the office building to be "cantilevered above the existing facade" of
the terminal and perched on its roof. The "Breuer II Revised" design proposed
a tearing down of part of the terminal and stripping features from the facade.
See id. at 116-17.

139. Id. at 116-17.
140. Id. at 115-16. On September 21, 1967, the Board of Estimate confirmed
the Landmarks Preservation Commission's designation of the terminal, "a 'landmark' and designated the 'city tax block' it occupies, a 'landmark site.' " Id.
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Planning Commission for construction permission. 1'" The Commission denied Penn Central's application

42

because the proposed struc-

ture was not architecturally sympathetic to the landmark.143 Moreover,
the railroad could not sell a significant portion of the air rights
1
because all potential receiving lots under the 1968 amendments "

were already fully developed. 145 The railroad found itself in a difficult
position. It could not develop the unused development rights on its
terminal site, and it could not transfer these rights to an "adjacent
lot."

On October 7, 1969, the city amended the 1968 TDR regulations
in response to Grand Central's predicament. 46 The 1969 amendment
instituted two changes in the previous law. First, the City Planning

Commission expanded the concept of "adjacent site ' ' 47 to include
a recipient lot located at previously impermissible distances from

the transferor site.148 Under this new definition, an "adjacent site"
could be at the end of a chain of lots held in common ownership
extending from the transferor site, provided the first parcel was

contiguous to or across the street from the transferor site.

49

Thus,

various properties owned by Penn Central, such as the Barkley,
Biltmore and Commodore hotels, would be eligible recipients of the

141. Id.
142. Id. at 117.
143. Id. The Landmarks Preservation Commission stated that "to balance a 55story office tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than
an aesthetic joke." Id. at 117-18.
144. Those lots contiguous to the terminal or across the street or intersection
were the only potential receiving lots under the 1968 amendments. See RP. CP20253, supra note 4, at 301-02; see also supra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
145. Marcus, supra note 55, at 885.
146. See REP. CP-20938, supra note 97, at 877; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 114.
147. An "adjacent site" at this time represented a lot contiguous to the landmark
building or a lot across the street or intersection opposite the landmark building.
N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 74-79 (1968), reprinted in REP. CP-20253, supra note
4, at 301; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
148. REP. CP-20938, supra note 97, at 877. The amended definition of "adjacent
site" included a lot "contiguous or one which is across a street and opposite to
another lot or lots which except for the intervention of streets or street intersections
form a series extending to the lot occupied by the landmark building." N.Y. CITY
ZONING REs. § 74-79 (1969), reprinted in REp. CP-20938, supra note 97, at 875
(emphasis added). Under this chain of ownership concept, "[t]heoretically, the air
rights from a landmark could be sold several blocks away." Gottlieb, A Zoning
Fight Again Imperils Grand Central, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at B8, col. 4.
149. REP. CP-20938, supra note 97, at 877; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
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terminal's development rights despite the fact that they were blocks

away.

150

Second, the 1969 amendments abandoned the restriction that had
limited the air rights transfer to a twenty percent increase' on the

transferee lot. 52 Instead, the landmark was permitted to transfer all
of its unused development potential to one receiving lot.'
The first recipient of Grand Central's unused development rights

was Philip Morris, Co. 54 In 1978, Philip Morris purchased 75,000
square feet' 55 of unused development rights from Grand Central

Terminal to construct an office building'5 6 across the street from
the landmark.'
In retrospect, the case is an illustration of spot-zoning,' an illegal
provision enacted solely for the benefit of one landowner, that is

not in accord with any well-considered plan. 59 Moreover, to permit
a single recipient lot in an already overdeveloped section of Man-

hattan to receive an extensive amount of air rights undermines sound
urban planning concerns.

160

B. South Street Seaport: Area-Wide TDR and Air Rights
Banking
With Grand Central Terminal as precedent, the New York City
Planning Commission recognized the increased mobility of TDR as

150. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115.
151. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152. Compare N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 74-792 (1968), reprinted in REP. CP20253, supra note 4, at 302 (20% limitation) with N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 74792 (1970), reprinted in REP. CP-21166, supra note 105, at 352 (20% limitation
omitted).
153. See supra note 152.
154. Report on the Transfer of Development Rights from Grand Central Terminal
to 120 Park Avenue, [1979] N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. C-780404-ZSM,
at 1.
155. Id.
156. Philip Morris intended the building to be its world corporate headquarters.
The building contained "448,000 square feet of floor area and cost approximately
$50 million" to build. This total included 137,000 square feet for "additional floor
area than [that which] is allowed as-of-right in a C5-3 zoning district," 75,000
square feet of which was obtained from the Grand Central transfer. Id.
157. The Philip Morris building is "located across the street from Grand Central
Terminal on the west side of Park Avenue between East 41st and 42nd Streets."
Id. Ironically, the Philip Morris site was a legal transferee site even prior to the
1969 amendment. See Marcus, supra note 55, at 887.
158. 1980 HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 12.
159. Richards, supra note 133, at 34.
160. Id.
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an important urban planning tool to preserve and revitalize the entire
landmark district 6' of South Street Seaport. 62 Located south of the
Brooklyn Bridge on the East River waterfront, 63 the old seaport
was a nineteenth-century center of culture and maritime trade.'16
Time and neglect, however, had left the seaport's Schermerhorn Row
166
landmark buildings 65 in severe disrepair.
Motivated by the desire to revitalize this historic reservoir 167 and
to profit from the development of valuable land adjacent to the
burgeoning financial district, 68 the City Planning Commission embarked on a renewal plan for the entire area. 69 The city created
the special South Street Seaport District, 70° consisting of transferor
lots and receiving lots, to preserve the historic structures along
Schermerhorn Row while allowing for new commercial development

161. One proposal to preserve landmark sites through a specific area-wide plan
is John Costonis' "Chicago Plan." See, e.g., Costonis, The Chicago Plan, 85
HARv. L. REv. 574 (1972); see also Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An
Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 86 (1973). The proposal calls for the creation
of a "landmark development rights transfer district" which encompasses a concentration of city landmarks. Id. Landmark owners could sell unused development
rights to owners of non-landmark buildings within the prescribed district. Id.
Landmark owners could also opt for a cash award from the city for their excess
air rights instead of transferring them. Id. at 87. The city would create a "development rights bank" as a pool for the unused air rights of these recalcitrant
landmark owners. Id. The city could sell these pooled rights to other non-landmark
owners. Id. The "Chicago Plan" provided incentive for the establishment of the
South Street Seaport renewal plan.
162. For a discussion of the creation of the Special South Street Seaport District,
see Report on Amendment to Permit Increase in the South Street Seaport District,
[1981] N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. N-810597-ZRM [hereinafter REP. N810597-ZRM]; Report on an Amendment to the Brooklyn Bridge Southeast Urban
Renewal Plan, [1980] N.Y. CITY PLANNING COMM'N REP. C-800251-HUM [hereinafter
REP. C-800251-HUM]; Report on the Amended Urban Renewal Plan for the
Brooklyn Bridge Southeast Urban Renewal Area, [1972] N.Y. CITY PLANNING
COMM'N REP. CP-21962 [hereinafter REP. CP-21962]; Report Relating to the Establishment of a Special South Street Seaport District, [1972] N.Y. CITY PLANNIG
COMM'N REP. CP-21975 [hereinafter Rep. CP-21975]. See also N.Y. CITY ZONING
REP. §§ 89-00 to 89-07 (1972) (amended by § 88-00 to -08 (1986)).
163. REP. CP-21962, supra note 162, at 1.
164. REP. C-800251-HUM, supra note 162, at 10.
165. The seaport's Schermerhorn Row buildings are several small scale nineteenthcentury georgian row houses located on the "Schermerhorn Row Block... bounded
by Fulton and South Street, Burling Slip and Water Street." Id. at 2.
166. REP. CP-21962, supra note 162, at 2.
167. REP. C-800251-HUM, supra note 162, at 10.
168. REP. CP-21962, supra note 162, at 4.
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170. N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. §§ 12-10, 89-00 (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975,
supra note 162, at 3 (§ 89-00 amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 88-00 (1986)).

62
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in the whole seaport area.171 The sites upon which the historic
buildings rested were deemed "granting lots.' ' 72 These "granting
7
lots" could transfer their unused development rights to predesignated1
building sites on which the city would permit commerical development. 74 These designated sites were termed "receiving lots.' 75
The transfer of excess development rights could take place in two
distinct ways.' 7 ' In a simple transaction, the owner of an historic
property site sells unused air rights directly to a "receiving lot"
owner. 7 7 In a complex arrangement, the landmark owner transfers
excess development rights from his "granting lot" to an intermediary,
who then sells the rights on the owner's behalf to a "receiving
lot.'I 7 In the South Street Seaport development, for example, a
consortium of commercial banks that held the mortgages on seaport
buildings acted as the intermediary for many of these TDR transactions. 179

171. REP. CP-21962, supra note 162, at 4, 5. The 1982 zoning resolution provides
that the purpose of the establishment of the South Street Seaport District is to
preserve the Schermerhorn Row landmark buildings through "the transfer and
disposition of development rights from designated granting lots in the seaport area
to [slouth [s]treet commercial development." N.Y. CrrY ZONING REs. § 89-00(d) (1972),
reprinted in REP. CP-21975, supra note 162, at 3-4 (amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING
RES. § 88-00(d) (1986)) (emphasis omitted).

172. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 89-02 (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975, supra
note 162, at 4-5 (amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 88-02 (1986)). The zoning
resolution defines "granting lot" as "[a] zoning lot and closed or discontinued
portion of streets or air space over streets ... from which development rights may
be transferred." Id.
173. REP. CP-21962, supra note 162, at 4, 5.
174. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 89-04 (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975, supra
note 162, at 5 (amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 88-04 (1986)).
175. A "receiving lot" isdefined by the zoning resolution as a pre-identified
zoning lot "to which development rights may be added." N.Y. CITY ZONING RES.
§ 89-02 (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975, supra note 162, at 5 (amended by
N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 88-02 (1986)).
176. See N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 89-04 (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975,
supra note 162, at 5 (amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 88-04 (1986)).
177. N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 89-04(i) (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975, supra
note 162, at 5 (amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 88-04(i) (1986)). The resolution
provides that "development rights from each of the granting lots may be conveyed,
or otherwise disposed of ... directly to a receiving lot." Id.
178. N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 89-04(ii) (1972), reprinted in REP. CP-21975,
supra note 162, at 5 (amended by N.Y. CITY ZONING RES. § 88-04(ii) (1986)). TDR
transfer in the South Street Seaport District may also be accomplished by conveyance
from the granting lot "to a person for subsequent disposition to a receiving lot."
Id.
179. Marcus, supra note 55, at 891.
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Old Slip: Bending the Rules

The Old Slip transaction involved a tremendously complex TDR
project in which the development rights from a city-owned landmark
and a municipal firehouse were transferred through'8 0 an innovative
zoning lot merger to construct an office tower at 30 Old Slip Street
in lower Manhattan.' The plan included such exotic transactions
as the demapping8 2 of a city street, the cross-street diagonal transfer
of air-rights from a non-landmark site and the construction of a
new municipal fire station within a new commercial office building.' 83
The development site at 30 Old Slip contained 30,883 square feet
and allowed for a tower of 633,435 square feet at FAR 15.184 Financial
Square,' the building developed at the site, however, occupies approximately 877,000 square feet. 8 6 In order to achieve this additional
bulk, which amounts to FAR 20.78187 for the entire site, the City
Planning Commission enlarged the original development lot to form
a new "landmark zoning lot.""'88

180. This transaction marked the first time that New York City disposed of air
rights over its own properties. See Scardino, supra note 4, at D3, col. 3.
181. See generally REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16. The site at 30 Old Slip
Street housed the United States Assay Office. Developer Howard Ronson paid over
$27 million for the property in 1983. This figure represents the "highest price a
U.S. government building ever fetched at auction and twice what some bidders
had expected." Allen, supra note 1, at 23.
182. Demapping a street is a "bit of zoning hocus pocus, [which] doesn't
necessarily eliminate streets ...

[but] .

.

. erases them from city documents." Allen,

supra note 1, at 26. The demapping of Old Slip entails the "elimination, discontinuance and closing of a portion of Old Slip (approximately 31' x 88' or 2,764
square feet) located between .

.

. the site of the existing Firehouse .

.

. [and] ...

the site of the former First Precinct Police Station." REP. C-841070-ZSM,.supra
note 16, at 11. By demapping Old Slip, the portion of the street between the
landmark and the firehouse became part of the whole site. The merger of these
three areas expanded the development potential of the transferor site, thus increasing
the amount of available unused development rights to transfer.
183. See REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 1.
184. Id.at 2.
185. Howard Ronson is a British developer "best known for constructing office

towers with medium-size floors in Manhattan's financial district." Financial Square
is the name of the building Ronson is currently developing at 30 Old Slip Street.
See generally Allen, supra note 1, at 23.
186. This figure represents "less than Ronson had hoped for but still more than
25 percent above what the block's zoning would normally allow." Id.; REP. C-

841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 2, 3 (chart).
187. REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 3.
188. Id. at 11. This "landmark zoning lot" of 11,346 square feet is comprised

of 5,255 square feet attributable-to the landmark police station, "3,327 square feet
attributable to the zoning lot of the Firehouse" and "2,764 square feet attributable
to the area of the demapped portion of Old Slip." Id.
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The city created this "landmark zoning lot" through a merger of
the original lot containing the landmarked First Precinct Police
Station; another lot containing a firehouse for Hook & Ladder Co.
No. 15;189 and the intervening portion of Old Slip, which required
the submission and approval of a formal demapping' 90 application. 9
The City Planning Commission approved a transfer for only 135,273
square feet of the 204,223 square feet available from the "landmark
zoning lot" representing an additional 3.2 FAR. 92 The developer
thus could not exploit the full complement because he had already
received an additional 108,943 square feet of 2.53 FAR for agreeing
to an extensive public amenity program. 193 The key component in
this amenity package called for the creation of a landscaped, public
piazza 194 directly west of the landmark on the site where the firehouse
was situated. 195
The City Planning Commission concluded that this park would
improve visibility for the landmark police station and enhance the
congested area by providing usable open space. 96 In consideration
of the transfer of development rights, the city acquired a lease on

189. Id. Both of these lots, as well as "the bed of the street, are in [c]ity
ownership." Id.
190. Old Slip consists of "two narrow, parallel streets that are linked in the
middle-like the letter H-to define two tiny lots." Allen, supra note 1, at 25.
This intervening link constitutes the subject of the demapping application. Id. at
26. For an explanation of demapping, see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
191. REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 1. Many interesting benefits accompany the decision to demap Old Slip. By allowing the firehouse parcel to be
considered part of the overall landmark lot, the city circumvented the problem of
transferring air rights diagonally across a street, which is not permitted for a nonlandmark building. In addition, those air rights attributable to the firehouse experience an effective upgrade from FAR 15 for normal buildings to 18 for landmarks.
This upgrade significantly increases 'the amount of bulk available for transfer. In
the case of the demapped street portion, the city is essentially creating a very
valuable package of air rights at 18 FAR from nothing because the air above the
streets is !not deemed to have any development potential.
192. Id. at 12. The developer, Howard Ronson, paid "$2.9 million outright plus
$3.1 million in. other costs" for the air rights. Allen, supra note 1, at 27.
193. REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 1, 2, 4 (chart); Allen, supra note
1, at 27. A developer is awarded extra development rights if he agrees to build
aesthetic, recreational or service facilities for public use. See id. These provisions
are called bonusable amenities. See id. Ronson's public amenity program requires
that he build a public piazza and a new firehouse. Id.
194. REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 13. Other bonusable amenities Ronson
agreel to include were the widening of sidewalks and the creation of a public
arcade in the new building. See id. at 14.
195. Id. The plan calls for the demolition of the firehouse at its present site
and the redevelopment of a new facility at the development site. See id.
196. Id.
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a new firehouse of 13,500 square feet to be built on the ground
floor and mezzanine of the South Street side of the new building. 97
The fire department enthusiastically supported the plan. 19 Acquisition
of a new modern facility to increase fire protection for the changing
needs of Lower Manhattan had been the department's top priority
for several years. 199
Critics of the Old Slip transaction have charged the city with using
sleight of hand to assemble development rights that would not have
existed under normal circu mhstances.2 °° Since the firehouse is not a
landmark, a diagonal transfer across the Front Street intersection
would not normally be permitted. 20 1 The owners of 77 Water Street
claimed that the demapping of Old Slip Street would cause increased
vehicular congestion in the financial district 2 2 and that Financial
Square, once developed, would block almost entirely their building's
view of the East River. 20 3 The most important concern, however,
was that this transaction would set precedent for future TDR projects of this kind.2 4
IV.

Recommendations

The above examples 205 demonstrate the tremendous extent to which
the concept of TDR has developed in the last three decades. The
realization of creative interpretations of the New York City Zoning
Resolutions tests the outer limits of the law and sets precedents for

197. Id. at 13. The development site will lease the new station to the city for
a 50-year period with two 25-year renewal options for $10 per year. Id. The "facility
will be provided without the expenditure" of city funds for construction, fixtures
or maintenance. Id. Upon occupancy of the new station, Ronson will demolish
the old firehouse at his own expense and begin construction of the outdoor plaza.
Id.

198. Id.
199. Id.

200. Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, Col. 1.
201. Id.
202. See REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 8; Allen, supra note 1, at 23,
29.
203. REP. C-841070-ZSM, supra note 16, at 3, 10.
204. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1. Under the 1969 zoning resolution
amendment, a landmark could transfer air rights to an adjacent site at the end
of a chain of lots held in common ownership. See supra note 134 and accompanying
text. Because the city "owns more landmarks than any other single landlord" in
the city, taking the transaction to the ultimate extension, the city could "checkerboard [the air rights of] this landmark all the way to the West Side." Id. at
51, cols. 1-2.
205. See supra notes 127-204 and accompanying text.
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future imaginative transactions.
The long-range ramifications of
these transactions, such as the breakdown of traditional urban planning objectives behind the zoning laws, 20 7 however, make the shortrange financial objectives appear irresponsible. 28
The adverse social and aesthetic effects of these transactions are
numerous and irreparable. Increase development strains transportation, sewer, water, electric, police and fire services in areas unprepared
for population increase.20 9 Increased bulk and tower coverage on city
streets adds to congestion, loss of light and air and unanticipated
blockage of view corridors.2 t0 Architecturally, manipulation of the zoning rules can abruptly alter the character of neighborhoods. 2" ' A landmark is not enhanced by adjacent construction of enormous towers
blocking light and air 212 leaving some blocks to "end up looking like
21 3
Mutt and Jeff."
The underlying assumption of the original zoning laws was the
expectation that structures such as landmarks, schools and public
buildings would not be exploited to their fullest development potential.21 4 In view of this intent, the City Planning Commission and
the Board of Estimate must place stronger controls on inventive
TDR transactions. The City Planning Commission, New York City,
not-for-profit institutions and private developers alike should conform to the provisions of the 1968 and 1977 amendments 2'5 which
provide flexibility of application and allow for confined redistribution
of bulk rather than relocation to an unprepared area. 2 6 The City
Planning Commission must give greater deference to section 74-792
of the zoning resolution, which requires the evaluation of "the
relationship between the landmark building" and new developments
to safeguard "adverse effects on the character of the surrounding

206. See Allen, supra note 1, at 23-29; Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1;
Scardino, supra note 4, at D3, col. 1.
207. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
208. Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1.

209. City Planning Commission Report C-841070-ZSM enumerates several ways
in which areas are adversely affected by elaborate TDR transactions. REP. C-841070ZSM, supra note 16, at 4-9.

210. Id.; see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
211. See Allen, supra note 1, at 24.
212. Id.
213. See Allen, supra note 1,at 24; Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, col. 1; Scardino,
supra note 4, at DI, cols. 3, 5.
214. Supra note 213.
215. See supra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in addition to a general limitation on creative TDR

techniques, the City Planning Commission must limit the ability of
a landmark to "checkerboard ' 218 air rights throughout a chain of
219
lots held in common ownership.

V.

Conclusion

Private developers and not-for-profit institutions have stretched
the concept of TDR and set transaction precedents that may undermine the urban planning objectives of New York City's zoning
laws. To prevent this occurrence, the provisions of the 1968 and
1977 zoning amendments must be strictly construed. If the City
Planning Commission follows its own zoning laws, which allow TDR
to act in harmony with urban planning considerations, Manhattan
can simultaneously retain its characterization as the "vertical city"
and preserve its cultural institutions and landmarks.
Margaret Giordano

217. N.Y. CITY ZONING REs. § 74-792 (1986); see also supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
. 218. Dunlap, supra note 4, at 51, cols. 1-2; see supra note 204 and accompanying

text.
219. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.

